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Disentangling the Effects of a Banking Crisis: 
Evidence from German Firms and Counties†
By Kilian Huber*
Lending cuts by banks directly affect the firms borrowing from them, 
but also indirectly depress economic activity in the regions in which 
they operate. This paper moves beyond firm-level studies by esti-
mating the effects of an exogenous lending cut by a large German 
bank on firms and counties. I construct an instrument for regional 
exposure to the lending cut based on a historic, postwar breakup 
of the bank. I present evidence that the lending cut affected firms 
independently of their banking relationships, through lower aggre-
gate demand and agglomeration spillovers in counties exposed to 
the lending cut. Output and employment remained persistently low 
even after bank lending had normalized. Innovation and productivity 
fell, consistent with the persistent effects. (JEL E32, E44, G01, G21, 
G32, R11, R23)
The Great Recession followed a common pattern in many developed economies. 
There was a systemic banking crisis in the years 2008 and 2009, during which bank 
lending fell. Subsequently, there were two years of negative output growth and a 
slow recovery, during which output failed to return to its pre-crisis trend. This per-
sistence is unusual in the postwar history of developed economies (Friedman 1993). 
Is there a causal link between the reduction in bank lending and this growth pattern? 
Do bank lending cuts lead to deep and persistent recessions?
Motivated by these questions, this paper delivers causal evidence on the effects 
of bank lending on the real economy. I analyze a lending cut by Commerzbank, a 
large German bank. During the financial crisis, Commerzbank suffered significant 
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losses on its international trading book. These losses were unrelated to its  domestic 
loan portfolio, but forced it to reduce its loan supply to German borrowers. I study 
the effects of the lending cut using variation across German counties and firms in 
their dependence on Commerzbank.1 The analysis produces two main findings. 
First, the lending cut not only reduced the growth of firms that directly relied on 
Commerzbank’s loan supply. There were also significant indirect effects on firms 
with undisturbed loan supply, through reductions in local aggregate demand and 
agglomeration spillovers. The second main finding is that the lending cut had 
persistent effects. Output and employment remained low even after lending had 
normalized.
By focusing on an imported lending cut, I address the key identification chal-
lenge that plagues the literature on financial frictions: the reverse causality between 
the health of the banking sector and economic growth. Unlike most developed 
economies, Germany experienced no house price boom or decline, no endogenous 
banking panic, relatively little uncertainty, and no sovereign debt crisis before or 
during the Great Recession. Therefore, the lending cut by Commerzbank provides 
a suitable natural experiment to disentangle the causal effects of bank lending. 
To verify my empirical strategy, I show that firms with a pre-crisis relationship to 
Commerzbank held less bank debt after the lending cut. In a survey, these firms 
reported restrictive bank loan supply in 2009 and 2010, but not in any year before 
or after Commerzbank’s lending cut. An important contribution by Peek and 
Rosengren (2000) similarly uses an imported lending cut to isolate an exogenous 
loan supply shock.
A second identification challenge arises from the possibility that unob-
served shocks affected counties dependent on Commerzbank at the same time as 
Commerzbank’s lending cut. To address this possibility, I construct an instrumen-
tal variable (IV) for county Commerzbank dependence. The instrument is based 
on the enforced breakup of Commerzbank by the Allies after World War II, which 
led Commerzbank to set up three separate, temporary head offices in Düsseldorf, 
Frankfurt, and Hamburg. The data show that Commerzbank expanded its branch 
network around its temporary head offices while it was broken up. The association 
between distance to these cities and Commerzbank dependence has survived until 
today. I can thus use a county’s distance to the closest postwar head office as an 
instrument for Commerzbank dependence before the lending cut.
The first set of results shows that the lending cut had real effects on firms. 
Following the lending cut, firms dependent on Commerzbank reduced their capi-
tal stock and employment, relative to similar firms located in the same county, but 
with no pre-crisis Commerzbank relationship. Employment at a firm fully depen-
dent on Commerzbank was on average 5.3 percent lower than at a firm with no 
Commerzbank relationship. I call these firm-level responses the direct effects of the 
lending cut, because they were driven by firms’ immediate financial connections 
to Commerzbank. They are a partial equilibrium response, keeping constant other 
aggregate factors that affected firms independently of their banking relationships. 
The findings on the direct effects confirm the results of Almeida et al. (2012) and 
1 Commerzbank refers to all branches that were part of the Commerzbank network in 2009, including Dresdner 
Bank. 
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Chodorow-Reich (2014).2 I estimate effects of similar magnitude to the existing 
literature, which suggests that Commerzbank’s lending cut has external relevance to 
the United States and other countries.
An important question is whether banking shocks affect growth at higher lev-
els of economic aggregation. I test the effect on counties. I construct a measure of 
county Commerzbank dependence based on the average exposure to Commerzbank 
of firms in the county. The results show that gross domestic product (GDP) and 
employment in counties dependent on Commerzbank fell after the lending cut. A 
standard deviation increase in Commerzbank dependence lowered county employ-
ment after the lending cut by an average of 0.8 percent in the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) specification and 1.3 percent in the IV specification. The IV point estimates, 
based on the distance instrument, imply larger effects than the OLS estimates, but 
are not statistically different. This suggest that unobserved, negative shocks cannot 
explain the OLS results. By conditioning on the linear distance to each of the post-
war head offices in all IV specifications, I control for spurious correlations between 
growth after the lending cut and factors associated with proximity to one of the 
cities. This means the identification is solely driven by the distance to the closest 
postwar Commerzbank head office, rather than by the distance to one particular city.
Having established there are real effects on firms and counties, I discuss two 
aspects of the results in more detail: indirect effects and persistence. The first aspect 
relates to the difference in magnitude between the firm and county effects. Two 
types of firm-level effects determine the response of county aggregates. The first 
are the direct, partial equilibrium effects. In addition, there are indirect effects of 
the lending cut. These impact firms independently of their direct financial connec-
tions to Commerzbank. They arise when the aggregate economic environment of a 
county responds to the lending cut. For example, if directly affected firms reduce 
employment, the consumption of households falls, lowering aggregate demand in 
the county. Furthermore, a fall in the innovation activities of directly affected firms 
reduces agglomeration spillovers to neighboring firms.
I investigate whether significant indirect effects of the lending cut affected 
the county response. Specifically, I estimate the effect on firms of increasing the 
Commerzbank dependence of other firms in the county, while keeping constant the 
firms’ direct exposure to Commerzbank. The results show negative and sizable indi-
rect effects on producers of non-tradables and firms with high innovation activities. 
The data reject the hypothesis that in a county fully dependent on Commerzbank 
these indirect effects were smaller than the direct effect on a firm that borrowed only 
from Commerzbank. There is no evidence for an indirect effect on tradables produc-
ers with low innovation activities. This pattern of heterogeneity suggests that reduced 
county aggregate demand and lower agglomeration spillovers in  high-innovation 
industries generated the indirect effects. Migration and household debt were not 
affected, so they cannot explain the indirect effects.
The second aspect I discuss is that the effects on both firms and counties were 
persistent. The causal effects resemble the growth pattern of developed economies 
2 Gan (2007); Khwaja and Mian (2008); Amiti and Weinstein (2011); Schnabl (2012); Paravisini et al. (2015); 
Garicano and Steinwender (2016); Cingano, Manaresi, and Sette (2016); and Bentolila et al. (forthcoming) present 
further evidence. 
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during and after the Great Recession. During the years of the lending cut, growth 
was significantly lower. In the subsequent two years, affected firms and counties 
remained on a lower, roughly parallel trend, without any sign of convergence to the 
level of unaffected firms and counties. This implies that a temporary bank lending 
cut can persistently keep output and employment low even after bank loan supply 
has normalized. The dynamics of the estimated effects suggest that the bank lend-
ing cuts during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 may have contributed to the 
sluggish recovery from the Great Recession, even though the banking sector had 
stabilized by 2010 (Hall 2010).
Persistent effects are not generally a response to shocks. For example, I show 
that firms and counties exposed to lower export demand during the Great Recession 
recovered to the level of unaffected firms and counties in under two years. 
Neoclassical growth theory similarly implies that once credit markets have stabi-
lized, the economy should converge back to its pre-crisis trend (Fernald and Jones 
2014). A decrease in innovation and productivity, however, could explain the per-
sistent effects. Indeed, firms reduced innovation activities, proxied by patenting, 
when they were directly affected by Commerzbank’s lending cut. A back-of-the 
envelope growth accounting exercise suggests that county total factor productiv-
ity fell, implying that productivity losses may have played a role in generating the 
persistence.
Influential contributions by Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
argue that banking shocks affect the real economy. A number of more recent empir-
ical studies document that banking crises have been correlated with deep and per-
sistent recessions (Cerra and Saxena 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Schularick 
and Taylor 2012; Giesecke et al. 2014; Krishnamurthy and Muir 2017). But there is 
ambiguous causal evidence on the effects at levels of aggregation higher than the firm 
level. Peek and Rosengren (2000), Calomiris and Mason (2003), Ashcraft (2005), 
Benmelech, Bergman, and Seru (2011), and Mondragon (2015) find that banking 
shocks in the United States strongly reduce local economic activity. On the other 
hand, Driscoll (2004), Ashcraft (2006), and Greenstone, Mas, and Nguyen (2014) 
report no or only small effects. Mian and Sufi (2014) argue that business financ-
ing was not an important problem in the United States during the Great Recession. 
In contrast, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt (2015) and Beraja, Hurst, and 
Ospina (2015) calibrate models that show supply-side shocks, such as financial fric-
tions, best account for the growth pattern. In the German setting, Dwenger, Fossen, 
and Simmler (2015), Hochfellner et al. (2015), and Popov and Rocholl (2015) argue 
that banking shocks have real effects.
Ashcraft (2005) speculates that a reason for the different findings may be that 
small, regional differences in exposure to bank shocks are not informative about 
the consequences of a large, systemic lending cut. An advantage of studying 
Commerzbank’s lending cut is that the variation across counties in exposure to 
Commerzbank is large and uncorrelated with other contemporaneous shocks. In line 
with Romer and Romer (2017), the results show that going beyond binary measures 
of financial distress helps to identify the real effects of financial shocks.
I contribute to the literature by clearly differentiating between the contemporane-
ous effects of a lending cut and the effects after lending has stabilized. I present evi-
dence that productivity is affected. Furthermore, the existing literature has had to rely 
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on strong assumptions about the indirect effects. The findings of large  indirect effects 
are of interest to researchers studying the aggregate implications of a range of shocks, 
not just banking crises. It is a general problem in empirical work that well-identified, 
partial equilibrium effects may not be informative about the aggregate implications 
of a given shock (Acemoglu 2010). While the effects I estimate do not easily aggre-
gate into national effects (Nakamura and Steinsson 2014; Beraja, Hurst and Ospina 
2015; Chodorow-Reich 2017), the combination of firm and county data is sufficient 
to establish the two main findings of indirect county-level effects and persistence.
This paper also adds to the literature on the importance of a single firm, in this 
case a bank, in shaping macroeconomic outcomes. Models by Gabaix (2011) and 
Acemoglu et al. (2012) illustrate how idiosyncratic firm-level shocks may translate 
into large aggregate fluctuations. I show empirically that lending by a single finan-
cial institution can persistently affect regional output and employment, consistent 
with Amiti and Weinstein (forthcoming).
The paper proceeds in the following section by explaining the identification strat-
egy and the institutional background. I describe the data in Section II, including 
a new dataset on the relationship banks of German firms. Section III verifies my 
identification strategy, by showing that firms dependent on Commerzbank reported 
restrictive loan supply and held less bank debt after Commerzbank’s lending cut. 
Section IV reports the firm-level results on the direct effect and Section V performs 
the county analysis. Section VI discusses the evidence for the indirect effects and the 
persistent losses. Section VII concludes.
I. Identification and Institutional Background
A. Identification Strategy
This paper aims to estimate the causal effects of exposure to a bank lending cut 
on firms and counties. There are two well-known identification challenges. The first 
is reverse causality. A negative, exogenous shock to firms harms their lenders, for 
example because some firms default on loans. Therefore, banks may experience 
financial distress and cut lending because of the performance of their borrowers. The 
second identification challenge is that an omitted variable may simultaneously affect 
both the real outcome of interest and bank loan supply. For example, an expected 
reduction in regional growth would induce local firms to reduce employment and 
banks to cut lending to that region. The two identification challenges could lead to 
spurious correlations between lending cut exposure and growth, even if the true 
causal effect of a lending cut was zero.
I overcome the identification challenges by using the Commerzbank dependence 
of German firms and counties as proxy for their exposure to Commerzbank’s lending 
cut. Frictions on credit markets mean that firms depend on the loan supply of their 
relationship banks (Sharpe 1990). Firms and counties, for which Commerzbank was 
an important relationship bank, were therefore more exposed to the lending cut.
A lending cut can affect firms through multiple channels. It can reduce access 
to bank loans, affect the interest rate on loans and deposits, reduce the length of 
loans, and increase uncertainty regarding future credit access. Using just one of 
these variables as regressor would overestimate the effect of this particular variable. 
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Identifying the causal impact of each channel would require one separate instrument 
per channel (Chodorow-Reich 2014). I do not pursue such approaches here. Instead, 
I estimate the reduced-form impact, where Commerzbank dependence serves as 
proxy for exposure to a lending cut. This strategy overcomes the problem of reverse 
causality because Commerzbank’s lending cut was exogenous to the performance 
of its German loan portfolio, as shown in Section IB. To address possible bias due 
to omitted unobservable variables at the regional level, I propose an instrument for 
county Commerzbank dependence in Section IC.
B. The Origin of Commerzbank’s Lending Cut
This section argues that Commerzbank’s lending cut during the financial crisis 
of 2008–2009 was an exogenous shock to its German borrowers. Commerzbank 
was responsible for around 9 percent of total bank lending to German nonfinancial 
customers in 2006. Its lending stock developed in parallel to that of the other banks 
until 2007, as shown in Figure 1. In 2008 and 2009, lending by Commerzbank fell 
sharply. Subsequently, it returned to a parallel trend relative to its peer group of 
other commercial banks.3
Why did lending decrease? Commerzbank is a universal bank, which means it 
earns both interest income from lending and non-interest income from trading and 
investing in international financial markets. During the financial crisis, Commerzbank 
suffered significant losses and write-downs on its trading portfolio. The trading 
losses led to a fall in Commerzbank’s equity capital in every year between 2007 and 
2009, decreasing it by 68 percent during this period. Commerzbank responded by 
cutting its loan supply to the German economy for two reasons. First, the Basel II 
regulations require a bank to hold at least 4 percent of its risk-weighted assets in 
equity. When equity falls, banks have to reduce assets (and start raising new equity). 
Second, the equity losses raised Commerzbank’s cost of external funds, so it needed 
to lower risk exposure to be able to access funding markets.
The changes in Commerzbank’s equity capital were entirely driven by write-
downs on financial instruments and profits, as shown in panel A of Figure 2. 
Write-downs on financial instruments included, for example, changes in the valu-
ation of derivatives the bank held and were unconnected to the firm and household 
loan portfolio. The change in profits was also unrelated to firms and households. 
Panel B illustrates that trading and investment income was entirely responsible 
for the negative profits. Interest income, on the other hand, which includes what 
Commerzbank earns from lending to firms and households, remained on an upward 
trend up to 2009.
The trading losses were due to Commerzbank’s investments in asset-backed 
securities related to the United States subprime mortgage market and its exposure 
to the insolvencies of Lehman Brothers and the large Icelandic banks. In 2008, 
Commerzbank had wrongly forecast the duration of the financial crisis and the 
3 There are three types of banks in Germany: commercial banks, cooperative credit unions, and public banks 
(Landesbanken and savings banks). The cooperatives and public banks have a political and social mandate to 
upkeep lending, unlike the commercial banks. Online Appendices E and F explain why trading losses at other 
German banks did not have real economic consequences, discussing papers by Dwenger, Fossen, and Simmler 
(2015) and Popov and Rocholl (2015). 
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 likelihood of institutional failures. Commerzbank head Martin Blessing later admit-
ted that his bank had reduced its exposure to asset-backed securities too late and had 
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Figure 1. The Lending Stock of German Banks
Notes: This figure plots the ln lending stock to German non-financial customers, relative to the year 2004, in 
2010 billions of euros. The data for Commerzbank include lending by branches of Commerzbank and Dresdner 
Bank. I sum their lending stock for the years before the 2009 take-over, using data from the annual reports. For 
all other banks, I use aggregated data from the Deutsche Bundesbank on German banks and subtract lending 
by Commerzbank. For all other commercial banks, I subtract lending by Commerzbank, the savings banks, the 
Landesbanken, and the cooperative banks.
Figure 2. Commerzbank’s Equity Capital, Write-Downs, and Profits
Notes: The left panel shows Commerzbank’s profits and write-downs and equity capital. Write-downs arise from 
changes in revaluation reserves, cash flow hedges, and currency reserves. Panel B shows the composition of 
Commerzbank’s profits. Interest income is interest received from loans and securities minus interest paid on depos-
its. Trading and investment income is the sum of net trading income, net income on hedge accounting, and net 
investment income. Pre-tax profit is interest income plus trading and investment income minus costs. The values are 
in year 2010 billions of euros. I aggregate the positions of Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank for the years before 
the 2009 take-over. The data are from the annual bank reports.
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believed that the United States government would not let Lehman Brothers fail. In 
comparison, Deutsche Bank avoided damage by hedging against a persistent drop in 
the United States housing market early on. Overall, the evidence shows that reverse 
causality is not a concern when I analyze the effects of Commerzbank’s lending cut.
A more detailed analysis of Commerzbank’s trading and loan portfolios is in 
online Appendix B. This analysis draws on 110 financial analyst research reports 
and a number of bank financial statements. The reports confirm that Commerzbank’s 
loan portfolio was not riskier than other German banks’. In fact, the reports interpret 
Commerzbank’s stable relationships to German firms as a source of strength. Its 
loan and trading divisions operated fairly independently, with no cross-divisional 
hedging relationship. While Commerzbank’s international trading portfolio suf-
fered losses, German bond markets remained stable and did not affect the health 
of Commerzbank and other German banks. Commerzbank’s 2009 acquisition of 
Dresdner Bank was agreed before both banks suffered the severe trading losses. Both 
banks followed a similar trading strategy and contributed approximately evenly to 
the trading losses of the joint institution. Hence, the estimated effects of the lending 
cut are not different for customers of the old Dresdner Bank. The analyst reports 
agree that Commerzbank had stabilized by 2011. It had refocused its operations on 
lending to German customers and had repaid the majority of the government support 
extended during the crisis.
C. An Instrument for County Commerzbank Dependence
The second identification concern is that unobserved shocks affected counties 
dependent on Commerzbank at the same time as the lending cut. To investigate 
this possibility, I propose an instrument for county Commerzbank dependence. The 
instrument isolates the effect of Commerzbank dependence from other unobserv-
able determinants of county growth. It is the county’s distance to the closest of three 
temporary, post-World War II head offices of Commerzbank. After World War II, the 
Americans were convinced that the Nazi government’s ability to wage war effectively 
stemmed from the Third Reich’s economic centralization. From 1948 to 1957, they 
forced three large German banks to break up into separate entities in mandated bank-
ing zones. During this period, Commerzbank and (and its 2009 acquisition Dresdner 
Bank) had three separate head offices in Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Hamburg.
These cities were chosen due to a combination of historic accident and power 
struggles among the Allies, rather than the bank’s business considerations. In the 
first banking zone, North-Rhine Westphalia, the British declared Düsseldorf as the 
state capital, because it was the only city with a large building that had survived the 
war (Düwell 2006). The banks followed the political power and settled there. In the 
second, Northern zone, the British ordered the surviving and non-imprisoned bank 
board members to set up a central head office in Hamburg. Frankfurt was chosen 
as head office for the Southern zone because the Americans had founded the new 
central bank there. At the time, Frankfurt was far from its current role as Germany’s 
financial center, but it was chosen for its central location (Horstmann 1991).
The literature has established that banks prefer to form relationships with 
geographically close customers (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Degryse 
and Ongena 2005). Indeed, in the years after the breakup, Commerzbank was 
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 significantly more likely to establish a new branch in counties close to its tempo-
rary head offices, as shown in online Appendix Table A.I. The association between 
county Commerzbank dependence and distance to a postwar head office has sur-
vived until today, allowing me to construct a distance instrument based on how far 
a county is located from the postwar head offices. This distance instrument is cal-
culated as the minimum of the linear (geodesic) distances to Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, 
and Hamburg. None of the three linear distances are perfectly correlated with the 
distance instrument. That means I can control for each of the linear distances to 
Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, and Hamburg in the IV specifications. In addition, I control 
for the linear distances to Berlin and Dresden, because historic, prewar head offices 
of Commerzbank were located there.
Controlling for the linear distances is a crucial aspect of my IV strategy. It 
addresses the concern that the instrument may simply pick up spurious factors that 
are correlated with proximity to one of the postwar head offices. For example, pro-
fessional services (such as legal, accounting, consulting, and advertising firms) 
experience cyclical demand fluctuations and are clustered around Düsseldorf. One 
may worry that the demand shock to this industry during the Great Recession, rather 
than Commerzbank’s lending cut, drives the results. By controlling for the linear 
distance to Düsseldorf, I statistically remove the correlation between industry con-
centration around Düsseldorf and growth after the lending cut. The identification 
is solely driven by the distance to the closest postwar Commerzbank head office, 
rather than the factors associated with proximity to one of the cities.
II. Data
This paper uses five datasets: a firm panel, a firm employment cross section, a 
firm survey, a county panel, and a household panel. The firm panel is based on bal-
ance sheet data from the database Dafne by Bureau van Dijk. It contains firms with 
non-missing data from 2007 to 2012 for the following variables: employment, wage 
bill, bank loans, value added, production capital (fixed tangible assets), and capital 
depreciation. Dafne reports the firms’ industry, foundation year, the export share 
(fraction of exports out of total revenue), and the import share (fraction of imports 
out of total costs). From the database Orbis, I match information on the firms’ pat-
ents. To construct the firm employment cross section, I extract data from Dafne for 
all firms, for which I can calculate the employment change from 2008 to 2012.
The firm survey is the Business Expectations Panel of the ifo Institute. The sample 
includes all firms that responded to the following two questions in 2006 and 2009: 
“How do you evaluate the current willingness of banks to grant loans to businesses: 
cooperative, normal, or restrictive?” and “Are your business activities constrained 
by low demand or too few orders: yes or no?”
I obtain proprietary data from the year 2006 on the names of the relationship 
banks (Hausbanken) of 112,344 German firms, recorded by the credit rating agency 
Creditreform. The agency collects information on the relationship banks from firm 
surveys and financial statements. In all three firm datasets, I link firms to their 
banks in 2006 using a unique firm identifier (Crefonummer). The pre-crisis timing 
avoids endogeneity from weak banks getting matched with weak firms during the 
Great Recession. I drop firms in the financial and public sectors. This leaves 2,011 
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matched firms in the panel, 48,101 in the employment cross section, and 1,032 in 
the survey. I construct a variable to measure a firm’s dependence on Commerzbank 
in 2006, called  CB de p fc for firm  f in county  c . It equals the fraction of the firm’s 
relationship banks that were Commerzbank branches out of the firm’s total number 
of relationship banks:
(1) CB de p fc =  number of relationship banks that are Commerzbank branche s fc       _____________________________________________________  total number of relationship bank s fc  .
I additionally construct a county panel dataset from 2000 to 2012. It contains data 
on GDP, employment, and migration from the German Statistical Federal Office. 
A variable called county Commerzbank dependence ( ‾ CB dep c for county  c ) mea-
sures the average value of firm Commerzbank dependence for firms with their head 
office in the county, using all 112,344 firms in the dataset of relationship banks. 
For each firm, I additionally construct a variable  ‾ CB dep fc that measures the aver-
age Commerzbank dependence of all the other firms in the county, from the point 
of view of an individual firm (leave-out mean). I calculate the distance measures 
for the IV specifications using the average geodesic distance between firms in the 
county and the location of the former Commerzbank head offices.
The household panel I analyze is the nationally representative German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). In 2002, 2007, and 2012, individuals reported the value 
of their outstanding debt. Every year they also reported a binary variable for whether 
they had any outstanding debt.
In some specifications in the paper, the outcome variable is the symmetric growth 
rate, a second-order approximation to the ln growth rate. This measure is bounded 
in the interval [−2, 2]. It has become standard in the establishment-level literature 
because it naturally accommodates zeros in the outcome variable, for example due 
to zero household debt or firm exit (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1998).4
Table 1 summarizes the firm panel. Firms have an average of three relationship 
banks. German firms traditionally form close and durable ties to their relationship 
banks. Dwenger, Fossen, and Simmler (2015) report that only 1.7 percent of firms 
find a new relationship bank per year. There is no information in my data on what ser-
vices exactly a firm receives from a particular bank. In a separate survey, Elsas (2005) 
finds that relationship banks mostly finance bank loans, both long- and  short-term, 
and provide payment transactions. A histogram of firm Commerzbank dependence 
is in panel A of Figure 3. Just under one-half of firms have a Commerzbank branch 
among their relationship banks. The average value of firm Commerzbank depen-
dence is 0.16.
To test whether firms borrowing from Commerzbank differ from other firms, I 
regress firm Commerzbank dependence on observables from the year 2006 using the 
firm panel. There is no evidence for an economically significant correlation between 
Commerzbank dependence and any of the firm characteristics, controlling for county 
4 The formal definition of the symmetric growth of  y between t − 1 and t is  g y = 2 ·   ( y t −  y t−1 )  ______ ( y t +  y t−1 ) . The firm panel 
contains some insolvencies, but no cases of zero employment, because the German insolvency process takes long. 
The employment cross section contains some cases of zero employment in 2012, because it includes more small 
firms, which have faster insolvency processes. 
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and industry. An analysis of firm summary statistics by bins of Commerzbank 
dependence is in online Appendix A.
In general, my firm datasets underweight small firms and the service sector rela-
tive to the population. In the population, 98 percent of firms have under 50 employ-
ees and 60 percent are in the service sector (as defined by the Statistical Federal 
Office). In the employment cross section, 72 percent of firms have fewer than 
50 employees and 53 percent are in the service sector. The selection into the firm 
panel requires that Dafne reports balance sheet variables for every year. This leaves, 
on average, larger firms (15 percent under 50 employees) and fewer in the service 
sector (48 percent) in the firm panel. Importantly, the results in the two datasets turn 
out to be similar and there is no heterogeneity in the effects by firm size or sector.
County summary statistics are in Table 2. The mean population of a county in 
2000 was 203,280 and mean county Commerzbank dependence is 0.12. There is 
Table 1—Summary Statistics for the Firm Panel
Mean SD p5 p50 p95
Firm CB dep 0.16 0.23 0 0 0.5
Number of relationship banks 3.00 1.54 1 3 6
Employment 913.71 11,592.54 19 132 2,030
Wage 32.04 47.15 15.51 29.46 46.37
Capital 57,711.61 544,582.57 225.75 5,467.81 196,539.06
Liabilities 152,628.46 3,657,557.10 1,552.79 8,848.93 213,144.20
Export share 11.02 21.31 0 0 64
Import share 5.24 16.73 0 0 40
Age 47.60 45.90 13.00 31.00 126.00
Bank debt/liabilities 0.48 0.26 0.05 0.49 0.90
Liabilities/assets 0.66 0.21 0.26 0.68 0.98
Firms 2,011
Notes: The data are from the firm panel for the year 2006. Monetary values are in year 2000 thousands of euros. 
Capital is the book value of fixed tangible assets. The wage is the total wage bill divided by the number of employ-
ees. The export share is the percentage of exports out of total revenue, and the import share is the percentage of 
imports out of total costs.
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Figure 3. Firm and County Commerzbank Dependence
Note: The figure shows histograms of firm Commerzbank dependence for the 2,011 firms in the firm panel (panel A) 
and of county Commerzbank dependence for the 385 counties in the dataset (panel B).
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significant variation in county Commerzbank dependence, as shown in the panel B 
of Figure 3 and in the map in online Appendix Figure A.I.
III. The Effect of the Lending Cut on Bank Debt
This section contains the first step of the empirical analysis. It verifies my empiri-
cal strategy by showing that Commerzbank’s lending cut reduced the bank loan sup-
ply of firms. Hence, Commerzbank dependence is a valid proxy for firms’ exposure 
to a lending cut. I find no effect on household debt and explain why.
A. Firm Survey Evidence on Commerzbank’s Lending Cut
I examine whether firms dependent on Commerzbank perceived their banks 
to lend more restrictively. The results are in Table 3. The outcome variable is the 
answer to the question: “How do you evaluate the current willingness of banks to 
grant loans to businesses: cooperative, normal, or restrictive?” All the specifications 
control for firm industry, federal state, size, and age. A lagged dependent variable 
from 2006 accounts for preexisting, time-invariant differences in bank loan supply.
The coefficient on firm Commerzbank dependence in column 3 has the interpre-
tation that in 2009 a firm fully dependent on Commerzbank perceived its banks to 
be 0.47 standard deviations less willing to grant loans, compared to a firm with no 
Commerzbank relationship. The estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level. The effect remained significant in 2010, as Commerzbank continued its lend-
ing cut. There was no significant association between Commerzbank dependence 
and perceived bank loan supply in 2007 and 2008, indicating the absence of a pre-
trend. Commerzbank repaid most of the government equity in 2011 and refocused 
its operations on the core business of lending. Accordingly, the negative effect of 
Commerzbank dependence disappeared in 2011 and turned positive in 2012. This is 
in line with Figure 1, which shows Commerzbank’s lending stock returning to the 
same trend as the other commercial banks from 2011 onward. The lending cut only 
led to temporary credit constraints.
Table 2—Summary Statistics for the County Dataset
Mean SD p5 p50 p95
County CB dep 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.23
2000 GDP (year 2010 bn euros) 6.01 9.12 1.46 3.63 14.31
2000 population (1,000s) 203.28 229.39 52.68 147.12 487.13
2000 employment (1,000s) 98.27 126.49 29.90 64.50 220.40
Former GDR 0.16 0.37 0 0 1
Landesbank in crisis 0.67 0.47 0 1 1
Distance instrument −1.63 0.97 −3.43 −1.51 −0.28
GDP growth, 2008–2012 2.66 6.18 −7.25 2.73 11.76
Employment growth, 2008–2012 2.79 3.22 −1.98 2.77 7.21
Observations 385
Notes: The data are from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. The distance instrument is the negative of the 
county’s distance to the closest post war Commerzbank head office, in 100 kilometers. Landesbank in crisis is a 
dummy for whether the county’s Landesbank suffered losses in the financial crisis (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen 
2011). Growth rates are in percent.
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There was no difference in the perceived level of demand between firms depen-
dent on Commerzbank and other firms in any year (online Appendix C). This shows 
worse demand shocks cannot explain the reduction in loan supply.
B. The Effect of Commerzbank’s Lending Cut on Firms’ Bank Debt
Having established that firms dependent on Commerzbank reported reduced loan 
supply, I test whether the lending cut actually reduced bank debt. The outcome is the 
natural logarithm of firm bank loans. I run specifications using the firm panel data-
set, including year and firm fixed effects. Table 4 presents the results. The regressor 
of interest is firm Commerzbank dependence interacted with d, a dummy for the 
years following the lending cut, 2009 to 2012.
The point estimate in column 1 indicates that firms dependent on Commerzbank 
held less bank debt after the lending cut, but the effect is imprecisely estimated. 
Column 2 controls for firm county, age, and size, while column 3 additionally 
conditions on industry and the export and import shares. These control variables 
improve the precision of the estimates. The coefficient in column 3 is statistically 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. It implies that a firm fully dependent on 
Commerzbank held 20.5 percent less bank debt in the years following the lending 
cut. This is similar to the decline in Commerzbank’s aggregate lending stock by 
17 percent during that period, compared to the other German banks (Figure 1).5
These results imply that Commerzbank dependence is a valid proxy for exposure 
to Commerzbank’s lending cut. Firms dependent on Commerzbank were unable to 
5 There was no heterogeneity in the size of the lending cut by characteristics such as firm productivity, firm size, 
county Commerzbank dependence, or county economic growth (online Appendix Figure A.II). This suggests that 
Commerzbank did not cut lending disproportionately to firms with weaker growth prospects. Heterogeneity in the 
lending cut would not affect my identification strategy, since I use predetermined Commerzbank dependence as 
proxy for lending cut exposure. 
Table 3—Firm Survey on Banks’ Willingness to Grant Loans
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm CB dep −0.111 −0.095 −0.473 −0.316 0.059 0.379
(0.157) (0.140) (0.190) (0.182) (0.197) (0.184)
Dep. var. from 2006 0.631 0.522 0.380 0.365 0.335 0.206
(0.041) (0.047) (0.051) (0.055) (0.055) (0.050)
Observations 856 988 1,032 946 898 503
R2 0.460 0.371 0.204 0.213 0.207 0.199
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size bin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from cross-sectional firm regressions for different years. The outcome variable 
is the answer to the question: “How do you evaluate the current willingness of banks to grant loans to businesses: 
cooperative (coded as 1), normal (0), or restrictive (−1)?” It is standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. 
The coefficients are interpreted as the standard deviation increase in banks’ willingness to grant loans from increas-
ing Commerzbank dependence by one. The control variables include fixed effects for 36 industries, 16 federal 
states, 4 size bins (1–49, 50–249, 250–999, and over 1,000 employees in the year 2006), and the ln of firm age. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the county.
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 substitute other lenders for Commerzbank. This was the case even though all firms 
were located in regions where other healthy lenders operated, as county Commerzbank 
dependence ranged from 1 to 31 percent. The results therefore suggest an important 
role for credit market frictions, even in the presence of alternative healthy lenders.
C. The Effect of Commerzbank’s Lending Cut on Household Debt
I investigate whether Commerzbank’s lending cut also affected households’ 
access to bank loans. Thirty-two percent of Commerzbank’s interest income in 2006 
stemmed from households. Table 5 analyzes the household panel GSOEP. The out-
come in the first three columns is the symmetric growth rate of debt. The effect 
of county Commerzbank dependence is small and statistically insignificant in all 
specifications. The estimate in column 2 controls for county characteristics and pre-
determined individual debt holdings. It implies that households in a county entirely 
dependent on Commerzbank experienced an increase in their growth rate of debt 
between 2007 and 2012 by 0.7 percentage points. Adding individual control vari-
ables in column 3 raises the coefficient, but it remains insignificant. The outcomes 
in columns 4 to 8 are dummies for whether an individual has any outstanding debt 
in the given year. There is no significant effect of county Commerzbank dependence 
in any year between 2008 and 2012.
These results can be explained by features of the German financial system that 
facilitate bank-switching for households. For example, the government-owned 
development bank KfW cofinances nationally standardized mortgage contracts in 
cooperation with private and public banks. This is important because mortgage 
debt comprised 91 percent of German household debt. Households can apply for 
these mortgages through any bank, regardless of whether they have a preexisting 
Table 4—Firm Bank Loans and Commerzbank Dependence
(1) (2) (3)
Firm CB dep × d −0.101 −0.166 −0.205
(0.079) (0.080) (0.078)
Observations 12,066 12,066 12,066
R2 0.009 0.078 0.094
Number of firms 2,011 2,011 2,011
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects × d No Yes Yes
ln age × d No Yes Yes
Size bin fixed effects × d No Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects × d No No Yes
Import and export share × d No No Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from firm OLS panel regressions. The outcome in all col-
umns is firm ln bank loans. Firm CB dep is the fraction of the firm’s relationship banks that 
were Commerzbank branches in 2006. d is a dummy for the years following the lending cut, 
2009 to 2012. The following time-invariant control variables are calculated for the year 2006 
and interacted with d: fixed effects for 70 industries, 357 counties, and 4 firm size bins (1–49, 
50–249, 250–999, and over 1,000 employees); the ln of firm age; the export share (fraction of 
exports out of total revenue); and the import share (fraction of imports out of total costs). The 
data include the years 2007 to 2012. R2 is the within-firm R2. Standard errors are two-way clus-
tered at the level of the county and the industry.
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 relationship bank or not. KfW raised its mortgage commitments to households by 
26.5 percent during the crisis. Aggregate lending to private customers by commer-
cial banks actually rose slightly between 2007 and 2010, which suggests that other 
commercial banks were able to compensate households for Commerzbank’s lend-
ing cut. In contrast, aggregate lending to corporate borrowers by commercial banks 
fell, which implies firms were not able to turn to other lenders. Consistent with 
these findings, a recent paper by Jensen and Johannesen (2017) shows that when 
bank-switching costs are low, there is no effect of lending cuts by individual banks 
on household debt.
IV. The Direct Effect on Firms
Having established that Commerzbank dependence is a valid proxy for firm 
exposure to Commerzbank’s lending cut, I proceed to estimating the real effects of 
the lending cut on firms. This section focuses on the direct effect, which is driven 
by firms immediate financial connections to banks that cut lending. The effect oper-
ates independently of the economic environment a firm faces. That means it is a 
partial equilibrium response, identified by comparing two similar firms affected by 
the same aggregate shocks. The direct effect has been the focus of the firm-level 
literature, for example Almeida et al. (2012) and Chodorow-Reich (2014).
Table 5—Household Debt and County Commerzbank Dependence
Outcome: 
Total debt 
growth 
2007–2012
Total debt 
growth 
2007–2012
Total debt 
growth 
2007–2012
Debtor 
2008
Debtor 
2009
Debtor 
2010
Debtor 
2011
Debtor 
2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
County CB dep 0.107 0.007 0.112 0.027 0.080 −0.052 0.050 0.104
(0.234) (0.272) (0.300) (0.126) (0.124) (0.114) (0.131) (0.165)
ln mortgage debt, 2002 −0.042 −0.042 −0.036 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.011
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ln other debt, 2002 −0.006 −0.006 −0.005 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Debtor in 2002 fixed effects −0.028 −0.028 −0.088 0.278 0.253 0.231 0.208 0.202
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Observations 6,423 6,423 6,423 10,829 9,992 9,206 8,520 7,409
R2 0.048 0.053 0.069 0.395 0.399 0.404 0.289 0.288
County controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from cross-sectional OLS regressions using data on individuals over 16 years of 
age from the GSOEP. The outcome in columns 1 to 3 is the symmetric growth rate of total debt from 2007 to 2012. 
If an individual has no debt in either year, the growth rate is set to zero. The outcomes in columns 4 to 8 are dummy 
variables for any outstanding debt in the given year. The mean value of the outcome in 2007 is 0.4. To avoid drop-
ping observations with zero debt in 2002 from the sample, I add 1 euro to the 2002 debt levels before transforming 
them into the ln control variables. The county controls include 17 industry shares, population density, population (in 
ln), GDP per capita (in ln), and the Schufa 2003 debt index, as described in Table 8. The individual controls are all 
measured in 2007. They include dummies for sex, the individual’s employment status (unemployed, full-time, part-
time, not in labor force), the employment status of household members (at least one full-time employed, at least 
one part-time employed, none employed), the former GDR, the number of children in the household, the number 
of adults in the household, the number of years in education of the most-educated household member (<10, 10, 11, 
12, 13, >13), ten dummies for the deciles of the age distribution, and ten dummies for the deciles of the household 
income distribution. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the county.
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A. Firm Specification
I use the firm panel to estimate equation (2), for firm  f in county  c at time  t ;  β is the 
direct effect;  d t post is a dummy for the years following the lending cut, 2009 to 2012:
(2)  y fct = ζ + β CB dep fc ×  d t post +  κ c ×  d t post + Γ′  X fc ×  d t post +  γ fc +  λ t +  ε fct .
The specification includes county fixed effects interacted with the post-lend-
ing cut dummy,  κ c ×  d t post . This is an important step in isolating the direct effect. 
It keeps constant any county-specific shocks associated with the Commerzbank 
dependence of other firms in the county. Firm fixed effects  γ fc account for time-in-
variant, firm-specific differences in the outcome. Year fixed effects  λ t control for 
changes in the outcome that are common to all firms in a year, for example due 
to macroeconomic fluctuations. Finally,  X fc is a vector of further control variables, 
listed in Table 6. The standard errors are two-way clustered at the level of the county 
and the industry.
The identifying assumption in this section is that there were no unobservable 
shocks within counties correlated with firm Commerzbank dependence. The evi-
dence supports this assumption. Figure 4 shows that firms with and without a rela-
tionship to Commerzbank followed parallel employment trends before the lending 
cut. The firm panel shows no strong correlation between Commerzbank depen-
dence and firm observables in 2006 (online Appendix A). There was no effect of 
Commerzbank dependence on perceived product demand in any year before the 
lending cut, and an effect on perceived credit constraints only during the lending cut 
(online Appendix C).
B. Firm Results
Table 6 reports the main result of this section in column 3. The point esti-
mate implies that, following the lending cut, employment at a firm fully depen-
dent on Commerzbank was on average 5.3 percent lower than at a firm with no 
Commerzbank relationship. The modest impact of the control variables across the 
first three columns of Table 6 strengthens the argument that Commerzbank depen-
dence was not significantly correlated with other determinants of firm growth. The 
existing literature estimates direct effects of a similar magnitude, suggesting that 
Commerzbank’s lending cut has external relevance. For instance, Chodorow-Reich 
(2014) for the United States and Bentolila et al. (forthcoming) for Spain find that 
firms connected to distressed banks reduced employment growth by 4 to 5 percent-
age points.
The remaining results in Table 6 support the view that reduced bank loan sup-
ply was responsible for the effect of Commerzbank dependence, rather than unob-
served shocks hitting all firms dependent on Commerzbank. Column 4 reports 
no statistically significant effect on firms with a low share of bank loans out of 
total debt. The effect on bank-dependent firms is strong. Column 5 shows there 
is no effect on firms with Commerzbank dependence greater than zero and up to 
one-quarter. These firms had a relatively large number of other relationship banks 
that could step in after Commerzbank cut lending. The effect is strongest for firms 
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Table 6—Firm Employment and Commerzbank Dependence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm CB dep × d −0.044 −0.047 −0.053
(0.021) (0.016) (0.015)
Low bank debt dep. × firm CB dep × d −0.035
(0.032)
High bank debt dep. × firm CB dep × d −0.071
(0.020)
(0 < firm CB dep  ≤ 0.25) × d 0.007
(0.016)
(0.25 < firm CB dep  ≤ 0.5) × d −0.017
(0.008)
(0.5 < firm CB dep  ≤ 1) × d −0.065
(0.018)
Observations 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,066
R2 0.026 0.098 0.124 0.125 0.125
Number of firms 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects × d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size bin fixed effects × d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
ln age × d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects × d No No Yes Yes Yes
Import and export share × d No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from firm OLS panel regressions. The outcome in all columns is firm ln employ-
ment. Firms with low (high) bank debt dependence have up to (over) 50 percent of their liabilities with banks. 
The control variables, the standard error calculations, the years covered by the data, and the definition of R2 are 
explained in Table 4.
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Figure 4. Firm Employment Effects
Notes: This figure plots the time series of the mean ln employment of firms with and without Commerzbank as 
one of their relationship banks. The time series are divided by their 2006 value. The data are from the firm panel.
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with Commerzbank dependence over one-half, which had few alternative options 
to access bank loans.6
Table 7 analyzes other outcomes and thereby sheds light on how firms adjust to 
a lending cut. The capital stock decreased by an average of 13 percent. Therefore, 
the capital-labor ratio fell, which suggests firms use bank loans primarily to finance 
capital investment. Firms dependent on Commerzbank were capital-constrained, 
which increased their average product of capital, measured as value added per cap-
ital in column 3. On the contrary, the lending cut did not affect the average product 
of labor and the average wage, relative to other firms in the same county, as shown 
in columns 4 and 5 respectively. This is consistent with a competitive county labor 
market. Column 6 reports no effect on the interest rate, in line with evidence from 
the United States credit card market (Ausubel 1991).
V. The Effect on Counties
The previous section established that there were significant direct effects of the 
lending cut on firms. In this section, I test whether the lending cut also had effects at 
a higher level of aggregation, on counties.
A. County Specification
I estimate equation (3) for county  c at time  t :
(3)  y ct = ζ + ρ ‾ CB dep c ×  d t post + Γ′ X c ×  d t post +  γ c +  λ t +  ε ct . 
6 In unreported results, I find no heterogeneity in the effect on capital-intensive industries (consistent with 
Paravisini et al. 2015), on large firms (consistent with Bentolila et al. forthcoming), on firms in counties with rel-
atively high county Commerzbank dependence, or on firms dependent on Dresdner Bank before the 2009 acquisi-
tion. Online Appendix D shows firms dependent on Commerzbank did not suffer higher losses on the value of their 
financial assets during the financial crisis. 
Table 7—Further Firm Outcomes and Commerzbank Dependence
Outcome: Capital Val add Val add/capital Val add/empl Wage Int rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm CB dep × d −0.130 −0.061 0.069 −0.008 0.001 −0.003
(0.038) (0.028) (0.038) (0.024) (0.011) (0.003)
Observations 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,066 12,024
R2 0.131 0.116 0.116 0.091 0.069 0.073
Number of firms 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,011 2,004
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls × d Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from firm OLS panel regressions. The respective outcome is given in the column 
title. Capital is the ln book value of fixed tangible assets. Value added (val add) is the ln of revenue minus expen-
diture on intermediates. Value added per worker is ln(val add/empl) and per unit of capital is ln(val add/cap). The 
wage is the ln of the wage bill divided by the number of employees. The interest rate is the interest paid over total 
liabilities. The control variables, the standard error calculations, the years covered by the data, and the definition of 
R2 are explained in Table 4.
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The coefficient on  ‾ CB dep c ×  d t post , scaled by 100, measures the average percent-
age change in the outcome following the lending cut in a county fully dependent on 
Commerzbank. Here,  γ c is a county fixed effect and  λ t a year fixed effect;  X c is a vec-
tor of time-invariant control variables, described in the notes of Table 5. The standard 
errors are clustered at the level of 42 quantiles of the countys’ industrial production 
share (GDP share of mining, manufacturing, utilities, recycling, construction). This 
is a more general method than clustering at the level of the county. It allows for arbi-
trary correlations of the errors across counties of similar industrial structure.
B. County OLS Results
Panel A of Figure 5 plots the growth rate of county GDP from 2007 to 2012 
against Commerzbank dependence. The line of best fit shows a statistically signif-
icant negative relationship, suggesting that the lending cut lowered GDP growth.
Table 8 reports the results of the corresponding OLS specifications. The key result 
of this section is in column 2. The point estimate implies that a standard deviation 
increase in Commerzbank dependence (6 percentage points) lowered county GDP 
by an average of 1 percent after Commerzbank’s lending cut. This specification con-
trols for the two main identification concerns. The first concern is that idiosyncratic 
shocks to certain industries and exposure to the trade collapse during the Great 
Recession may be correlated with Commerzbank dependence. I control for the share 
of 17 industries among the county’s firms in 2006 as well as the average export and 
import shares of firms in the county. The second main concern is that some regions 
fared worse because they were in the former GDR or because their Landesbank suf-
fered losses in the financial crisis (Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen 2011). I add dummies 
for counties in these regions to the specification. Column 3 tests the robustness of 
the result further, by controlling for population density, ln population, ln GDP per 
capita, and household leverage. The coefficient remains stable, suggesting that the 
results are not driven by preexisting differences in county characteristics.
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Figure 5. County GDP Growth, Commerzbank Dependence, and the Distance Instrument
Notes: Panel A plots county GDP growth from 2007 to 2012 against county Commerzbank dependence. Panel B 
plots county GDP growth against the distance instrument, where both variables are residualized of the linear dis-
tances to Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin, and Dresden, and of a dummy for the former GDR. Both linear 
slope coefficients are negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
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The specification in column 4 estimates that a standard deviation increase in 
Commerzbank dependence lowered county employment by an average of 0.83 per-
cent, conditional on the main controls.7 Following Blanchard and Katz (1992), I 
investigate whether the effects can be explained by migration across counties in 
column 5. The outcome is county net migration divided by 2006 employment. The 
coefficient is insignificant and small, implying there was no migratory response. 
Mertens and Haas (2006) similarly report no association between county unemploy-
ment rates and migration in Germany.
C. County IV Results
I use the distance instrument to test whether there is any evidence for bias in 
the OLS estimates. Panel B of Figure 5 plots the growth rate of GDP from 2007 to 
7 Burda and Hunt (2011) show that the German government’s well-known short-time work scheme did not have 
a strong effect on the labor market. Firms could only claim subsidies for a maximum of two years. The level of 
short-time workers was back down to its pre-crisis value in 2011, suggesting if anything only a transitory impact 
(Fujita and Gartner 2014). 
Table 8—County Outcomes and Commerzbank Dependence (OLS)
Outcome: GDP GDP GDP Empl. Net migr.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
County CB dep × d −0.132 −0.165 −0.141 −0.138 0.003
(0.063) (0.066) (0.077) (0.042) (0.006)
Observations 5,005 5,005 5,005 5,005 1,925
R2 0.301 0.341 0.350 0.494 0.592
Number of counties 385 385 385 385 385
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Former GDR fixed effects × d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry shares × d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export and import shares × d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landesbank in crisis × d No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population × d No No Yes No No
Population density × d No No Yes No No
GDP per capita × d No No Yes No No
Debt index × d No No Yes No No
Estimator OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Notes: This table reports estimates from county OLS panel regressions of county outcomes on Commerzbank 
dependence (CB dep) interacted with d, a dummy for the years following the lending cut, 2009 to 2012. The out-
come in columns 1 to 3 is ln GDP, in column 4 ln employment, and in column 5 net migration (immigration − 
out-migration) normalized by 2006 employment. The industry shares are 17 variables, giving the fraction of firms 
in each of the 17 industries in 2006 (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, utilities, recycling, construction, retail 
trade and vehicle repairs, transportation and storage, hospitality, information, finance, real estate, business ser-
vices, other services, public sector, education, health). The export share is the fraction of exports out of total rev-
enue and the import share is the fraction of imports out of total costs, both averaged across firms in the county for 
2006. Landesbank in crisis is a dummy for whether the county’s Landesbank suffered losses in the financial crisis. 
Population density, total population (ln), and GDP per capita (ln) are from 2000. Debt index is a 2003 measure 
of county household leverage, calculated by credit rating agency Schufa (Privatverschuldungsindex). The regres-
sions are weighted by year 2000 population. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 42 quantiles of the coun-
ty’s industrial production share (GDP share of mining, manufacturing, utilities, recycling, construction). The GDP 
and employment data include the years 2000 to 2012. Migration data for all counties are only available for the years 
2008 to 2012. R2 is the within-county R2.
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2012 against the distance instrument. There is a negative and statistically significant 
reduced-form relationship. Figure 6 confirms that the growth rate of GDP was lower 
only during the years of Commerzbank’s lending cut. In the figures and in all IV 
specifications, I add five separate linear distance control variables, measuring the 
distances to five former head offices in Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin, 
and Dresden. This ensures that the effect is identified only through the distance to 
the closest of Commerzbank’s postwar head offices. I also include a dummy for the 
former GDR to account for the postwar breakup of Germany.
Table 9 reports the regression results. Columns 1 and 2 show a strong first-stage 
relationship between the distance instrument and Commerzbank dependence. The 
IV second-stage coefficients in columns 3 to 7 report negative and significant effects 
on county GDP and employment and no effect on migration, consistent with the 
OLS results. Adding the list of control variables hardly affects the point estimates, 
strengthening the argument that the distance instrument is exogenous to county 
growth.8
In general, the IV point estimates imply larger effects than the OLS estimates. The 
coefficient in column 4 implies a GDP loss of 2.2 percent from a standard  deviation 
8 Online Appendix Table A.III reports that the linear distances to postwar Commerzbank head offices or other 
major cities are uncorrelated with growth after the lending cut, conditional on the distance instrument. Online 
Appendix Table A.IV shows that controlling for the linear distances removes the correlation between the instrument 
and a number of county characteristics. I confirm the effects of Commerzbank’s lending cut using a county-level 
proxy for the change in bank loans in online Appendix G. An unreported placebo experiment for Deutsche Bank, 
using the distance to the closest postwar Deutsche Bank head office as instrument, finds no effect of Deutsche Bank 
dependence on county growth. Hence, there is no generic effect from dependence on large banks. 
Figure 6. Reduced-Form Impact of the Instrument on the County GDP Growth Rate
Notes: This figure is based on a single regression, in which the dependent variable is the county’s annual GDP 
growth rate. The plotted point estimates are the coefficients on the instrument, interacted with annual dummy vari-
ables. The vertical lines are 90 percent confidence intervals. The regression includes year and county fixed effects 
and the full set of control variables from Table 9, including the linear distances. The standard errors are calculated 
as in Table 8.
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increase in Commerzbank dependence, conditional on the main controls. There could 
be a number of reasons for the difference. First, county Commerzbank dependence 
may be measured with error, since it is based on the Creditreform sample of firms, 
which covers roughly one-half of total employment in Germany. Measurement error 
would attenuate the OLS, but not the IV estimates. Second, there is some evidence 
that Commerzbank’s expansion across German counties was driven by economic 
considerations. For example, Klein (1993) describes that Commerzbank followed a 
unique branch expansion strategy in the former GDR after German reunification in 
1990. The other German banks simply took over the preexisting branch networks of 
the former GDR state banks, while Commerzbank built up its own. Commerzbank 
may have selectively expanded into counties that are less affected in recessions. 
In unreported results, I find no general association between county Commerzbank 
dependence and the average annual growth rate between 2000 and 2009. Only in the 
sole recessionary year 2003, counties dependent on Commerzbank grew faster. If 
this indicates a systematic positive correlation between county Commerzbank depen-
dence and growth in recessions, OLS estimators of the effect of Commerzbanks lend-
ing cut on county growth would be biased upward.
It is important to recognize, however, that the OLS and IV coefficients are not 
statistically different. This suggests the difference between the point estimates could 
also be driven by estimation error. The most important insight from this section is 
that the IV analysis confirms the negative effect of Commerzbank’s lending cut on 
county growth.
Table 9—County outcomes and Commerzbank Dependence (IV)
Outcome: CB dep CB dep GDP GDP GDP Empl Net migr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Distance instrument × d 0.028 0.042
(0.005) (0.006)
County CB dep × d −0.335 −0.367 −0.345 −0.208 0.026
(0.118) (0.182) (0.173) (0.113) (0.020)
Observations 5,005 5,005 5,005 5,005 5,005 5,005 1,925
R2 0.876 0.941 0.322 0.348 0.355 0.504 0.590
Number of counties 385 385 385 385 385 385 385
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Former GDR fixed effects × d Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear distances × d No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry shares × d No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Export and import shares × d No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Landesbank in crisis × d No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Population × d No Yes No No Yes No No
Population density × d No Yes No No Yes No No
GDP per capita × d No Yes No No Yes No No
Debt index × d No Yes No No Yes No No
Estimator OLS OLS IV IV IV IV IV
Notes: This table reports estimates from county panel regressions. Columns 1 and 2 report the first stage and col-
umns 3 to 7 the IV regressions. The distance instrument is the negative of the county’s distance to the closest post-
war Commerzbank head office, in 100 kilometers. The linear distances include the county’s distances to Düsseldorf, 
Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin, and Dresden. The outcomes, other control variables, weights, standard error calcula-
tions, the years covered by the data, and the definition of R2 are explained in Table 8.
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VI. Discussion of the Results
With the firm and county estimates in hand, I turn to discussing two aspects of how 
the lending cut affected firms and counties. First, I examine how the direct,  firm-level 
effects translated into county outcomes. Specifically, I test whether there is evidence 
for an indirect effect on all firms in counties with high county Commerzbank depen-
dence, independent of the firms’ individual banking relationships. Second, I show that 
the temporary lending cut had persistent effects on firms and counties.
A. The Indirect Effect
The response of county aggregates depends on two types of firm-level effects. 
The first are the direct effects on firms borrowing from Commerzbank. In addition, 
there may also be indirect effects on all firms in a county. Such indirect effects arise 
through changes in the county’s aggregate economic conditions due to the direct 
responses of firms borrowing from Commerzbank. This section explores whether 
indirect effects played a role in shaping the effect of the lending cut on counties.
I use the employment cross section dataset to estimate equation (4). The larger 
sample size of 48,101 firms enables me to estimate the direct effect  β and the indi-
rect effect  σ in the same specification. The outcome is the symmetric growth rate of 
firm employment between 2008 and 2012:
(4)  employment growt h fc = ζ + β CB dep fc + σ ‾ CB dep fc + Γ′ X fc +  ξ fc . 
Table 10 presents the results. The main object of interest in this section is the indirect 
effect, that is the coefficient on the average Commerzbank dependence of other firms 
in the county. I include firm control variables in column 1. The point estimate is neg-
ative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Adding the county controls in 
column 2 hardly affects the estimate. To illustrate the size of the indirect effect implied 
by the point estimates, consider a firm fully dependent on Commerzbank, operating in 
a county where no other firm had Commerzbank among their relationship banks. This 
Table 10—The Direct and Indirect Effects on Firm Employment 
Growth
(1) (2)
Firm CB dep −0.030 −0.036
(0.009) (0.009)
CB dep of other firms in county −0.166 −0.170
(0.076) (0.082)
Observations 48,101 48,101
R2 0.012 0.017
Firm controls Yes Yes
County controls No Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates from cross-sectional firm OLS regressions. 
The outcome is the symmetric growth rate of firm employment from 2008 to 
2012. CB dep of other firms in county is the average firm Commerzbank 
dependence of all the other firms in the county. The firm control variables are 
the same as in Table 4, except there are no county fixed effects. The county 
controls and the standard error calculations are the same as in Table 8.
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firm reduced employment growth between 2008 and 2012 by 3.6 percentage points, 
the direct effect.9 If the same firm had operated in a county where the Commerzbank 
dependence of the other firms had been 1 standard deviation (6 percentage points) 
greater, employment growth would have fallen by 4.6 percentage points. In this lat-
ter county, firms with no direct relationship to Commerzbank would have reduced 
employment growth by 1 percentage point, solely due to the indirect effect.
Table 11 gives an overview of the county employment change implied by the dif-
ferent estimates in the paper. The estimate in row 1, based solely on the direct effect, 
underestimates the county employment loss, because it ignores the indirect effect. 
The average county Commerzbank dependence is 0.12, so the direct effects harm 
only a relatively small fraction of firms. It is the indirect effect that amplifies the 
effects of the lending cut throughout the county economy. The estimates of the sum 
of direct and indirect effects are larger than the estimate in row 1, whether I use the 
county data (rows 2 and 3) or the firm data (row 4). The IV estimate based on the 
county dataset is close to the OLS estimate based on the firm employment cross sec-
tion dataset, supporting the view that there is no significant bias in the OLS estimates.
I turn to investigating which economic mechanisms underlie the indirect effect, 
by testing two theoretical channels. The first argues that the direct effects reduced 
local agglomeration spillovers. These can exist in the form of knowledge spill-
overs, transport costs of inputs and outputs, or the quality of the local labor market 
(Ellison, Glaeser, and Kerr 2010; Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti 2010; Bloom, 
Schankerman, and Van Reenen 2013). There is evidence that  high-innovation 
industries are particularly dependent on such spillovers (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and 
Henderson 1993; Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Henderson 2003). This leads to the 
hypothesis that the indirect effect should increase with the innovation intensity of 
an industry. I classify industries with R&D spending in excess of 2.5 percent of rev-
enue (the OECD cutoff) as high innovators, using data on German industries from 
Gehrke et al. (2010). For low-innovation industries, I rely on Gehrke et al. (2013), 
who identify a group of industries with the lowest score on all innovation indicators 
in the Mannheim Innovation Panel. The lists of high- and low-innovation industries 
are in online Appendix Tables A.V and A.VI.
The second theoretical channel argues that household consumption fell due to 
employment losses at firms dependent on Commerzbank, reducing aggregate demand 
9 This point estimate of the direct effect is slightly smaller than in Table 6, because I use a different outcome, the 
symmetric growth rate. Using the ln difference as outcome renders the point estimates almost identical. 
Table 11—The Implied County Employment Change Based on Different Estimates
Estimate from Estimated Point 95 percent CI
section Estimator Dataset effect estimate Lower Upper
1. IVB OLS Firm panel Only direct −0.32 −0.49 −0.14
2. VB OLS County panel Direct & indirect −0.83 −1.31 −0.34
3. VC IV County panel Direct & indirect −1.25 −2.58 −0.09
4. VIA OLS Firm cross section Direct & indirect −1.24 −2.17 −0.29
Notes: This table reports different estimates of the county employment loss from increasing county Commerzbank 
dependence by a standard deviation (6 percentage points). Row 1 uses the estimate of the direct effect from column 
3 of Table 6. Row 2 uses the county OLS estimate from Table 8, column 4. Row 3 uses the county IV estimate from 
Table 9, column 6. Row 4 uses the sum of direct and indirect effects from column 2 of Table 10.
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in the county. Producers of non-tradables rely strongly on local demand. Producers of 
tradables, on the other hand, mainly depend on national and global demand. Following 
the methodology of Mian and Sufi (2014), I classify an industry as tradable if the 
sum of its exports is at least US$10,000 per worker or US$500 million in total (using 
industry data from the United States). The retail and restaurant sector are classified 
as non-tradable. In addition, firms with a Herfindahl index in the top quartile produce 
tradables and firms in the bottom quartile produce  non-tradables. This uses the fact 
that non-tradable industries are highly dispersed, because they need to produce locally 
in the markets they serve, while tradable industries tend to be concentrated. If indus-
tries remain unclassified, I call them producers of part-tradables.
The interaction of innovation and tradability leaves me with seven industry 
types.10 I estimate a separate indirect effect for each industry type, by interacting 
the variable  ‾ CB dep fc in equation (4) with a full set of industry type dummies. The 
specification controls for the direct effect, by including the variable  CB dep fc . In 
addition to the full set of firm and county control variables, the specification also 
includes fixed effects for the categories of tradability and innovation, to ensure that 
the coefficients are not biased by common shocks to firms in these categories.
Figure 7 plots estimates of the indirect effect by industry type. There is a sta-
tistically significant indirect effect for high-innovation producers of tradables and 
producers of non-tradables.11 The effect on high-innovation firms is consistent with 
agglomeration spillovers particular to these industries. In unreported results, I find 
that the Commerzbank dependence of other high-innovation firms in the county 
drives the indirect effect on high-innovation firms. There is no significant indirect 
effect from the Commerzbank dependence of low- and medium-innovation firms. 
Furthermore, the indirect effect is larger in counties with a high, above-median 
density of high-innovation firms. This suggests agglomeration spillovers are more 
important in innovation clusters.
The significant indirect effect on producers of non-tradables is consistent with 
the second theory on demand. After directly affected firms in their county reduced 
employment, producers of non-tradables experienced the largest reduction in 
demand relative to the other industry types and cut employment.12 Moretti (2010) 
studies the local employment multiplier in the United States, finding that for each 
additional job in the tradable sector, 1.6 jobs are created in the non-tradable sector. 
The corresponding figure in my setting is 1.7.13 Hence, my estimate of the local 
demand channel is close to Moretti (2010).
10 The industry shares in my sample are: producers of tradables with low innovation activities: 2 percent; trad-
ables, medium: 29; tradables, high: 8; part-tradables, low: 11; part-tradables, medium: 25; non-tradables, low: 5; 
non-tradables, medium: 20. Few firms are high-innovation part-tradables and non-tradables producers, so I add 
them to the medium-innovation industry types. 
11 I find no significant heterogeneity by industry type in the direct effect, so this cannot explain the results. In 
a robustness check, I find similar results when I do not follow the Mian and Sufi (2014) methodology, but instead 
classify firms with a strictly positive export share as tradable producers. 
12 Changes in household debt cannot explain the non-tradable indirect effect. Di Maggio and Kermani (2017) 
estimate an elasticity of non-tradable employment with respect to household debt of 0.2. Using their estimate, the 
lower bound of the 90 percent confidence interval of the household debt effect from column 1 of Table 5 can only 
explain 15 percent of the indirect effect on non-tradable, low-innovation firms’ employment. 
13 To get this figure, I first calculate the effect of the lending cut on tradable employment in a county, in which 
the tradable sector is fully dependent on Commerzbank. The direct effect leads to an employment loss of 3.5 percent 
for all tradable producers (estimated in the regression for Figure 7). In addition, 21 percent of tradable producers 
are high-innovators, so they also suffer the indirect effect of 39.9 percent. Overall, tradable employment declines by 
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The two theories predict no indirect effect on producers of tradables with low 
innovation activities. Indeed, the coefficient on these firms in Figure 7 is positive 
and statistically insignificant. In an unreported test, I also find no indirect effect for 
low- and medium-innovation tradables producers located in an industrial cluster, 
unlike for high-innovation firms. Furthermore, I find no heterogeneity in the direct 
effect by county Commerzbank dependence. This implies that potential increases in 
the difficulty of finding new lenders cannot explain the indirect effect.
B. The Persistence of the Effects
Firms dependent on Commerzbank reported restrictive bank loan supply in 2009 
and 2010, but not in any year before or after (Section IIIA). Figure 4 shows that 
employment at firms with Commerzbank among their relationship banks developed 
in parallel to other firms before the lending cut. In 2009 and 2010, firms dependent 
on Commerzbank grew more slowly. Afterward, they remained on a lower, parallel 
trend for two years. Figure 6 illustrates the same pattern for counties. Counties close 
to the postwar head offices, with greater Commerzbank dependence, grew more 
slowly during the years of the lending cut and did not recover afterward.
approximately 3.5 + 0.21 × 39.9 = 11.9 percent. The indirect effect on the average non-tradable firm is 25.9 per-
cent. Twenty-three percent of firms produce tradables. Therefore, the indirect effect reduces non-tradable employ-
ment by 0.23 × 25.9 = 6 percent. Multiplying the elasticity of non-tradable to tradable employment by 3.33, the 
ratio of non-tradable jobs to tradable jobs, gives the figure of 1.7. Further evidence on the local demand channel can 
be found in Bernstein et al. (forthcoming), Charles et al. (2017), and Giroud and Mueller (2017).
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Figure 7. The Size of the Indirect Effect by Industry Type
Notes: This figure illustrates heterogeneity in the indirect effect by industry type. The plotted point estimates are 
the effect of the Commerzbank dependence of all other firms in the county on the symmetric growth rate of firm 
employment between 2008 and 2012. The estimates are from a single regression that controls for the firm’s direct 
Commerzbank dependence and the other control variables from Table 10. The vertical lines are 90 percent confi-
dence intervals.
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Such persistent losses do not occur in response to all economic shocks. For 
example, firms and counties exposed to the drop in export demand during the Great 
Recession converged to the level of unaffected firms and counties in under two 
years, as shown in online Appendix H. A standard neoclassical production function 
implies that temporary shocks to the capital stock do not lead to persistent output 
losses. But there is no such mechanism that facilitates convergence after produc-
tivity losses. I investigate whether there is evidence that the lending cut lowered 
innovation and productivity.
Table 12 examines the effect of the lending cut on firms’ innovation activities, 
proxied by patents. The outcome in column 1 is the symmetric growth rate of the 
number of patents between the periods before (2005–2008) and after Commerzbank’s 
lending cut (2009–2012). If a firm produced no patents in either period, the growth 
rate is set to zero. If a firm produced at least one patent from 1990 to 2004, I call it 
a patenting firm. The effect on these patenting firms is large. The growth rate of the 
number of patents was approximately 55 percentage points lower at patenting firms 
entirely dependent on Commerzbank. There is no effect on non-patenting firms. 
It is possible that many non-patenting firms are structurally unsuited to ever issue 
patents, independent of credit supply, or that in a period of low global growth, few 
firms choose to commence patenting. Negative binomial count models in columns 2 
and 3 confirm that after the lending cut, patenting firms dependent on Commerzbank 
issued significantly fewer patents. There was no significant difference before the 
lending cut.14
A growth accounting exercise can inform an estimate of productivity changes at 
the county level. Conventional measures of TFP overestimate productivity losses 
during recessions, because they do not account for decreases in the utilization of 
existing labor and capital (Basu, Fernald, and Kimball 2006). Since the lending 
cut had no effect on county growth in 2011 and 2012, I alleviate this problem by 
focusing on changes from 2008 to 2012. An IV specification estimates that a stan-
dard deviation increase in Commerzbank dependence lowered output per worker 
by 1.8 percent from 2008 to 2012. There are no data on county capital. I rely on 
the firm panel to estimate that the capital-labor ratio at firms fully dependent on 
Commerzbank fell by 14.8 percent. Under the assumption that for all the other firms 
the capital-labor ratio grew at an identical rate, growth accounting implies that a 
standard deviation increase in Commerzbank dependence reduced county TFP by 
1.4 percent from 2008 to 2012. Fernald (2014) provides data on utilization-adjusted 
capital and labor inputs for the United States. I construct an adjustment factor to 
inflate my estimates of the changes in capital and labor. This factor is based on the 
average ratio of utilization-adjusted to unadjusted input changes, measured two years 
after the last three NBER recessions in Fernald’s data. Incorporating this adjustment 
slightly lowers the estimated TFP shortfall to 1.3 percent. This point estimate needs 
to be treated with caution, since it relies on strong assumptions about the loss in 
capital and the utilization adjustment.15 Overall, however, the firm and county data 
14 The average patenting process takes around two years. In unreported results, I find the effect on patents is 
entirely driven by the years after 2011, with no significant difference for the years before. 
15 I carry out two robustness checks. First, the estimate of TFP growth remains negative when I use adjustment 
factors larger than any value observed two years after a recession in Fernald’s data. Second, to explain the output 
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paint a  consistent picture. The results suggest innovation and productivity fell after 
the lending cut, which could explain the persistent losses.
VII. Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence on the causal effects of bank lending on eco-
nomic activity. It analyzes a lending cut by Commerzbank, a large German bank. 
The lending cut was not caused by domestic factors, but it was imported to Germany 
through Commerzbank’s trading losses on international financial markets during 
the financial crisis of 2008–2009. The results show that the lending cut lowered 
the output and employment of firms and counties dependent on Commerzbank. 
Employment at a firm fully dependent on Commerzbank fell by 5.3 percent, while 
a standard deviation increase in county Commerzbank dependence reduced county 
employment by 0.8 percent.
Two key findings stand out. First, there were indirect effects of the lending cut that 
affected firms independently of their immediate bank loan supply. The results sug-
gest that these indirect effects operated through lower aggregate demand and reduced 
agglomeration spillovers among high-innovation firms. Second, a bank lending cut 
causes an extended hangover. Both firms and counties dependent on Commerzbank 
experienced lower growth rates during the years of the lending cut. Thereafter, they 
returned to the growth rates of unaffected firms and counties, but did not converge 
loss while keeping TFP constant, capital would have had to fall by 5.6 percent. This equals 1.9 times the output loss, 
which is implausibly large given historic movements. 
Table 12—Firm Patents and Commerzbank Dependence
Outcome:
Growth rate  
of patents
Patents post 
lending cut
Patents pre 
lending cut
(1) (2) (3)
Patenting × firm CB dep −0.548 −0.770 0.206
(0.245) (0.409) (0.409)
Non-patenting × firm CB dep 0.037
(0.065)
ln patents, 1990–2004 0.671 0.687
(0.088) (0.116)
Observations 2,011 382 382
R2 0.251
ln age Yes Yes Yes
Size bin fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
County fixed effects Yes No No
State fixed effects No Yes Yes
Import and export share Yes Yes Yes
Only patenting firms in sample No Yes Yes
Estimator OLS Neg bin Neg bin
Notes: A patenting firm is defined as a firm that has produced at least one patent from 1990 to 
2004. The outcome in column 1 is the symmetric growth rate of the number of patents between 
the periods before (2005–2008) and after Commerzbank’s lending cut (2009–2012). If a firm 
produces no patents in either period, the growth rate is set to zero. The control variables and the 
standard error calculations in column 1 are the same as in Table 4. Standard errors in columns 
2 and 3 are clustered at the level of the industry.
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to the unaffected levels. This pattern resembles the growth experience of the United 
States and other developed economies following the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009.
The findings in this paper contribute to the academic discussion about the Great 
Recession and its aftermath. Reifschneider, Wascher, and Wilcox (2015) and 
Anzoategui et al. (2017) interpret the productivity slowdown following the Great 
Recession as an endogenous response to weak aggregate demand. This paper’s find-
ing of an indirect demand effect suggests that bank lending cuts during the finan-
cial crisis can partially account for the aggregate demand shortfall. In addition, the 
evidence in this paper shows a direct, causal link from bank lending cuts to lower 
innovation and productivity. Since economies are unable to make up productivity 
shortfalls in only a few years, recoveries from banking crises are slow. This pattern 
can be seen in the slow recovery from the Great Recession and the lengthy reces-
sions associated with banking crises in the cross-country literature.
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